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September 13, 1968

STATEMENT OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D. 1 MONTANA.)

MAIN FILE COPY
DO NOT REMOY~

THE SITUATION IN CZECHOSWV.AKIA
AND

U. S. FORCES IN EUROPE
Mr . President:

Many words have been spoken in the Senate about the Soviet
invasion of Czechoslovakia .

Many others will be spoken.

This action

was an outrageous affront to the people of that nation and a grave blow
to international stability.

Over half a million troops are reported on the move in Central
Europe.
its will .
Europe .

Great numbers are involved in occupying a small country against
They cast a long shadow over the prospects for a peaceful
They dim the hopes of people everywhere for a more peaceful

world.
In these remarks, I will not dwell on the various adverse
implications of the recent developments in Czechoslovakia .

In due

course a report on that subject will be forthcoming in consequence of a
brief visit which I made to Eastern Europe during the recent adjournment
of the Senate .

In these remarks , today, I will touch on only one aspect

of the subject--the question of American force reductions in Western
Europe, in the aftermath of the Czechoslovakia crisis .
Immediately after the Soviet invasion, I stated that there would
be no point in continuing to advocate an immediate reduction in the level
of these forces .

I made that statement with resignation and sadness .
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A reduction would have saved American taxpayers hundreds of millions of
dollars, over the next few years.

It would have had a significant correc-

tive effect on this nation's distorted balance of international payments.
It would have helped to restore relationships with the countries of Western
Europe to a normal basis; the continued presence of hundreds of thousands
of American troops, along with a great number of dependents' homesteads on
Western European soil is, per se, an abnormal relationship.
I believe, moreover, that step-by-step reductions of our forces
in Europe would have led the Western Europeans to assume a larger share of
the burden of their own defense which, in turn, may well have resulted in
closer cooperation among them.

I believe, too, that it would have contributed

to reducing the danger of catastrophic error which necessarily attends the
presence of hundreds of thousands of foreign troops confronting hundreds of
thousands of other foreign troops across a tense dividing line.

Finally,

reductions of our forces in Western Europe would have increased the pressures
for and may well have brought about reductions of Soviet forces in the
Eastern European countries, with or without negotiations to that end.
The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia has had the effect of
deferring these results.

How long they will remain deferred depends, in

great part, on the disposition which the Soviet government and its Warsaw
Pact allies, Romania excepted, may make of the occupation forces now in
Czechoslovakia.
We can hardly make substantial reductions in

u.

S. forces in

Western Europe while the Soviets have vastly increased their forces in
Eastern European countries and have done so, furthermore, in connection

- 3 with the military steamrollering of the independence of a small country.
To be sure, reductions in our forces even now, would not lessen, in any
way, our responsibility under the North Atlantic Treaty to join in the
common defense against an attack on Western Europe and the regions covered by
the North Atlantic Treaty.

Those responsibilities would be met in the event

of an attack, not only because they are treaty obligations, but because they
are inescapable responsibilities in terms of our own survival.
be met whether the U.

s.

They would

forces which were encamped in Western Europe at the

time of an attack numbered one division or ten divisions.
Nevertheless, a reduction in the U.

s.

contingents in Europe in

present circumstances could be subject to misinterpretation in both West
and East, and might conceivably lead to serious miscalculations.

That is

a risk which, it seems to me, we would be unwarranted in taking at this time,
in our interests and in the interests of peace.

It was that risk which led

me to suggest a temporary deferment of the question.
However, my views on the anachronistic size of the deployment of
American forces and dependents in Europe have not changed.

Certainly, I

do not believe that the number of these Americans should be increased at
this time, as some have suggested.

Moreover, in my judfgllent, it remains

desirable to undertake a gradual reduction in U. S. forces if and when the
situation in Eastern Europe offers reasonable assurance that developments
there are not going to spill over into Western Europe.

If and when that

time comes, I believe a positive plan should be ready to cut American forces
in Europe.

It should be a plan, phased over several years--perhaps on what

might be termed a D plus D basis, that is, the withdrawal of one division
of men with their dependents each year.

That reduction, in my judfgllent,

- 4 should continue until the force levels remaining would be sufficient only
to insure that military aggression from any source would enable the United
States promptly to set in motion its immense powers for the common defense
of the nations of the North Atlantic Pact.

In the light of modern military

technology, the five or six American divisions which are now stationed in
Europe are hardly required for that purpose.

In due course, it seems to me

that the number could be reduced to one or at most two.
I would like to make it plain that I believe that there has been
a dereliction in the failure to have set in motion, heretofore, positive plans
to bring about orderly, phased reductions in the European deployment.

Indeed,

some of us have been urging these reductions for more than a decade.

The

reiterated response, however, has been that "the time is not right."

The

time will never be right unless there is the will to face up to this situation.
Even now, the time is right for a search for substantial savings
in the cost of the European deployment.

Events in Eastern Europe, notwith-

standing, possibilities of economy may well exist in streamlining the superstructures at the various U. S. headquarters in Europe.

It is appropriate

to ask, for example, whether they are not top-heavy with high-ranking officers,
staffs, and prerogatives, at the European Command at Stuttgart, the U. S. Air
Force Headquarters in Europe at Wiesbaden, the European Communications Headquarters at Zweibrucken, or the Headquarters of the Commander in Chief, U.
Naval Forces in London.
made in

u.

s.

Substantial cuts, long overdue, have already been

S. civil establishments abroad on orders of retrenchment from

President Johnson.

It would be eminently desirable i f the same orders might

now be applied forthwith to the military entrenchments in Western Europe.

- 5 Had there been a timely reduction of forces in Western Europe,
it would have already saved large sums of public money and contributed
greatly to the strengthening of our international financial situation.
May I say that I do not see how timely reductions in our forces
would have impaired the defense of Western Europe.

Nor do I see--had they

been made some time ago, as urged time and again--how they would have had
any effect on the present situation in Czechoslovakia.

Certainly, the

presence of these forces, in full NATO complement, as they are now, has
added nothing to our ability to respond to events in that nation.

Indeed,

we would do well to ask ourselves if, on August 21, we had had three times

the number of men we now have in Western Europe or, for that matter, if
we had had only one-third the number, what difference it would have made

in our reactions to the developments in Czechoslovakia.
The fact is that NATO was formed to defend Western Europe and
associated nations in the North Atlantic Treaty against attack.

It was

not designed to defend a Warsaw Pact nation against an attack from within
that group.

Though we may deplore the occupation of Czechoslovakia, the

tragic event has not fallen--as it has developed to date--within the area
of our shared military responsibility under NATO.
within an area of unilateral U.

s.

responsibility.

Much less does it come

- 6 On the subject of responsibility, I should like to emphasize,
in closing, the importance which many Americans attach to Western Europe's
responsibility to increase its own defense efforts--relative to our own-in NATO.

It is not helpful to the common undertaking when Western European

defense budgets drop to levels disproport ionate to our own, when the number
of men in the uniforms of Allied nations declines, when the periods of conscription are shortened or abolished, and other evidence presents itself
of a reluctance on the part of Europeans to make sacrifices for their own
defense.

It makes Senators who ask their constituents to pay higher taxes

to cover increased defense costs and who vote the conscription of young
Americans for terms of obligated service which are equaled in length among
the NATO members only i n Greece, Turkey, and Portugal--it makes us question
policies that require these sacrifices of our people when others seem unwilling to make equivalent sacrifices for themselves .
I reiterate , therefore, that while events in Czechoslovakia may
counsel a temporary wait-and-see with respect to the present level of the
American NATO contingent and dependents in Europe, these events do not
cancel the validity of the concept of phased reductions.

The fact is that

the invasion of Czechoslovakia has not changed, in any way, two basic
elements in the proposal for such reductions which the Senate has had
under consideration for some time.
1.

This nation has budgetary and balance of payments

difficulties at a time when the Western European nations are more able
than ever before to meet added costs of defense .

Indeed, the West Germans

have a balance of payments surplus of several billion dollars a year, a
level so high that some West Germans describe it as "embarrassing."

..
- 7 2.

Our forces are in Europe for the defense of the NATO

countries against the threat of military attack from the East.

Yet,

despite Czechoslovakia, there is little indication that the other NATO
nations regard this threat as drastic enough to stimulate any significant
increase in financial and other sacrifices for their own defense.

Events

in Eastern Europe notwithstanding, if the NATO countries are unwilling to
make these sacrifices and our present financial plight is prolonged,
pressures for a reduction of American forces in Europe may be expected
to resume promptly--and properly so.
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House of Representatives
The House was not in session today. Its next meeting will be held on Monday, September 16, 1968, at 11:00 a.m.

Senate
FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER

13, 1968

The Senate met at 11 a.m., and was of the Journal of the proceedings of of Oklahoma, to be U.S. circuit judge,
called to order by Hon. PAUL J. FANNIN, a Thursday, September 12, 1968, be dis- lOth circuit.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempensed with.
Senator from the State of Arizona.
The Chaplain, Rev. Frederick Brown
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem- pore. Without objection, the nomination
Harris, D.D., offered the following pOre. Without objection, it is so ordered. is considered and confirmed.
The assistant legislative clerk read the
prayer:
nomination of Lawrence Gubow, of
Eternal God, Father of our spirits, with
MESSAGE
FROM
THE
HOUSE
Michigan, to be U.S. district judge for
a faith that will not shrink though
pressed by every foe, we would this day
A message from the House of Repre- the eastern district of Michigan.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, it is a
climb the altar steps which lead through sentatives by Mr. Hackney, one of its
darkness up to Thee, for our greatest reading clerks, announced that the pleasure to indicate my support for the
need is of Thee.
House had agreed to the report of the nomination of Mr. Lawrence Gubow of
In the crises of our times join us with committee of confe~nce on the disagree- Detroit, Mich., to be U.S. district judge
those who, across the waste and wilder- Ing votes of the two Houses on the for the eastern district of Michigan.
Mr.- Gubow has had a distinguished
ness of human hate and need, preparing amendments of the House to the bill CS.
the way of the Lord, throw up a high- 2515) to authorize the establishment of career as an attorney. Educated at the
way for our God.
the Redwood National Park in the State University of Michigan and its law
God the AU-righteous, man hath defied of California, and for other purposes.
school, he was admitted to the Michigan
Thee. Yet to eternity standeth Thy word;
bar in 1951. Subsequently, he served as
falsehood and wrong shall not tarry bean attorney with the Detroit law firm of
side Thee. Give to us peace in our time, LIMITATION ON -STATEMENTS DUR- Rosin & Kobel.
ING
TRANSACTION
OF
ROUTINE
0 Lord, that the sundered family of manIn 1953, Mr. Gubow joined the MichiMORNING BUSINESS
kind at last may be bound by golden
gan Coporation and Securities Commiscords of understanding fellowship around
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask sion and was chosen its commissioner in
the feet of the one God.
unanimous consent that statements in 1956. He served as commissioner until
In the dear Redeemer';; name. Amen. relation to the transaction of routine 1961, when he was appointed U.S. atmorning business be limited to 3 min- torney for the eastern district of Michigan, the postion he now holds.
utes.
DESIGNATION OF ACTING PRESIMr. Gubow serves as president of the
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro temDENT PRO TEMPORE
pore. Without objection, it Is so ordered. Jewish Community Council of Metropolitan Detroit, and he is a leader in the
The assistant legislative clerk read the
Jewish War Veterans of the U.S.A. and
following letter:
~ECUTIVE
SESSION
U .S. SENATE,
various Michigan veterans groups.
PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE,
I know Mr. Gubow as an able and
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, in
Washington, D.C., September 13, 1968.
view of the fact that in the Chamber at highly qualified member of the bar and
To the Senate:
this time is the distinguished majority as a widely respected public servant. He
Being temporarily absent from the Senate, I appoint Hon. PAUL J. FANNIN, a Sena- leader of the House, the Honorable CARL has bipartisan support for his nominator from the State of Arizona, to perform ALBERT, and inasmuch as his presence tion, and I am confident that he will
the duties of the Chair during my absence. fits in with the business of the Senate, I make an outstanding judge.
Mr. President, I am pleased to recomCARL HAYDEN,
ask unanimous consent that the Senate
President pro tempcn:e.
go into executive session to consider the mend that the Senate advise and consent
Mr. FANNIN thereupOn took the chair nominations on the Executive Calendar. to the nomination of Lawrence Gubow.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro temThe ACTING PRESIDENT pro temas Acting President pro tempore.
pore. Without objection, it is so ordered. pore. Without objection, the nomination
is confirmed.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
THE JOURNAL
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
unanimous consent that the President
be
immediately notified of the confirmaMr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
The assistant legisllvtive clerk read the
ask unanimous consent that the reading nomination of William J. Holloway, Jr., tion of these nominations.

s
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The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. With out objection, it is so ordered.
LEGISLATIVE SESSI ON
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
move that the Senate resume the consideration of legislative business.
The motion was agreed to; and the
Senate resumed the consideration of
legislative business.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that I may proceed
for an additional 5 minutes at this time.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. without objection, it is so ordered.
T HE SITUATION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND U.S . FORCES IN
EUROPE
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, many
words have been spoken in the Senate
about the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Many others will be spoken. This
action was on outrageous affront to the
people of that nation and a grave blow
to international stability.
Over half a million troops are reported
on the move in Central Europe. Great
numbers are involved in occupying a
small country against its will. They cast
a long shadow over the prospects for a
peaceful Europe. They dim the hopes of
people everywhere for a more peaceful
world.
In these remarks, I will not dwell on
the various adverse implications of the
recent developments in Czechoslovakia.
In due course, a report on that subject
will be forthcoming in consequence of
a brief visit I made to Eastern Eu~·ope
during the recent adjournment of the
Senate. In these remarks, today, I will
touch on only one aspect of the subjectthe question of American force reductions in Western Europe, in the aftermath of the Czechoslovakia crisis.
Immediately after the Soviet invasion,
I stated that there would be no point
in continuing to advocate an immediate
reduction in the level of these forces. I
made that statement with resignation
and sadness.
A reduction would have saved American taxpayers hundreds of millions of
dollars, over the next few years. It would
have had a significant corrective effect
on this Nllltion's distorted balance of international payments. It would have
helped to restore relationships with the
countries of Western Europe to a normal
basis; the continued presence of hundreds of thousands of American troops,
along with a great number of dependents' homesteads on Western European
soil, is, per se, an abnormal relationship.
I believe, moreover, that step-by-step
reduotions of our forces in Europe would
have led the Western Europeans to assume a larger share of the burden of
their own defense which, in turn, may
well have resulted in closer cooperation
among them. I believe, too, that it would
have contributed to reducing the danger
of catastrophic error which necessarily
attends the presence of hundreds of
thousands of foreign troops confronting
hundreds of thousands of other foreign

troops across a tense dividing line. Fin ally , reductions of our forces in Westem Europe would have increased the
pressures for and may well have brought
about reductions of Soviet forces in the
E astern European countries, with or
withoUJt negotiations to that end.
The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia
has had the effect of deferring these results. How long they will remain deferred
depends, in great part, on the disposition
which the Soviet Government and its
Warsaw Pact allies, Romania excepted,
may make of the occupation forces now
in Czechoslovakia.
We can hardly make substantial reductions in U.S. forces in Western Europe while the Soviets have vastly increased their forces in Eastern European
countries and have done so, furthermore,
in connection with the military steamrollering of the independence of a small
country. To be sure, reductions in our
forces, even now, would not lessen, in any
way, our responsibility under the North
Atlantic Treaty to join in the common
defense against an attack on Western
Europe and the regions covered by the
North Atlantic Treaty. Those responsibilities would be met in the event of an
attack, not only because they are treaty
obligations, but also because they are
inescapable responsibilities in terms of
our own survival. They would be met
whether the U.S. forces which were encamped in Western Europe at the time
of an attack numbered one division or
10 divisions.
Nevertheless, a reduction in the U.S.
contingents in Europe in present circumstances could be subject to misinterpretation in both West and East, and might
conceivably lead to serious miscalculations. That is a ris{ which, it seems to
me, we would be unwarranted in taking
at this time, in our interests and in the
interests of peace. It was that risk which
led me to suggest a temporary deferment
of the question.
However, my views on the anachronistic size of the deployment of American forces and dependents in Europe
have not changed. Certainly, I do not
believe that the number of these Americans should be increased at this time,
as some have suggested. Moreover, in my
judgment, it remains desirable to undertake a gradual reduction in U.S.
forces if and when the situation in Eastern Europe offers reasonable assurance
that developments there are not going
to spill over into Western Europe. If and
when that time comes, I believe a positive plan should be ready to cut American forces in Europe. It should be a
plan, phased over several years-perhaps
on what might be termed a D plus D
basis-that is, the withdrawal of one division of men with their dependents each
year. That reduction, in my judgment,
should continue until the force levels
remaining would be sufficient only to insure that military aggression from any
source would enable the United States
promptly to set in motion its immense
powers for the common defense of the
nations of the North Atlantic Pact. I n
the light of modem military technology,
the five or six U.S. divisions which are
now stationed in Europe are hardly re-
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quired for that purpose. I n due course,
it seems to me that the number could
be reduced to one or at most two.
I would like to make it plain that I
believe that there has been a dereliction
in the failure to have set in motion, heretofore, positive plans to bring about orderly, phased reductions in the European
deployment. Indeed, some of us have
been urging these reductions for more
than a decade. The reiterated response,
however, has been that "the time is not
right." The time will never be right unless there is the will to face up to this
situation.
Even now, the time is right for a search
for substantial savings in the cost of the
European deployment. Events in Eastern
Europe notwithstanding, possibilities of
economy may well exist in streamlining
the superstructures at the various U.S.
headquarters in Europe. It is appropriate
to ask, for example, whether they are not
topheavy with high-ranking officers,
staffs, and prerogatives, at the European
Command at Stuttgart, the U.S. Air Force
headquarters in Europe at Wiesbaden,
the European communications headquarters at zweibrucken, or the headquarters of the commander in chief, U.S.
Naval Forces in London. Substantial cuts,
long overdue, have already been made in
U.S. civil establishments abroad on
orders of retrenchment from President
Johnson. It would be eminently desirable
if the same orders might now be applied
forthwith to the military entrenchments
in Western Europe,
Had there been a timely redu-::tion of
forces in Western Europe, it would have
already saved large sums of public money
and contributed greatly to the strengthening of our international financial situation.
May I say that I do not see how timely
reductions in our forces would have impaired the defense of Western Europe.
Nor do I see-had they been made some
time ago, as urged time and again-how
they would have 'had any effect on the
present situation in Czechoslovakia. Certainly, the presence of these forces, in
full NATO complement, as they are now,
has added nothing to our ability to respond to events in that nation. Indeed, we
would do well to ask ourselves if, on August 21, we had had three times the number of men we now have in Western Europe or, for that matter, if we had had
only one-third the number, what difference it would have made in our reactions to the developments in Czechoslovakia.
The fact is that NATO was formed to
defend Western Europe and associated
nations in the North Atlantic Treaty
against attack. It was not designed to
defend a Warsaw Pact nation against an
attack from within that group. Though
we may deplore the occupation of Czechoslovakia, the tragic event has not fallen.:_as it has developed to date-within
the area of our shared military responsibility under NATO. Much less does it
come within an area of unilateral U.S.
responsibility.
On the subjed of responsibility, I
should like to emphasize, in closing, the
importance which many Americans at-
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tach to Western Europe's responsibility
to increase its own defense efforts--relative to our own-in NATO. It is not
helpful to the common undertaking when
Western European defense budgets drop
to levels disproportionate to our own,
when the number of men in the uniforms
of Allied nations decline, when the
periods of conscription are shortened or
abolished, and other evidence presents
itself of a reluctance on the part of
Europeans to make sacrifices for their
own defense. It makes Senators who ask
their constituents to pay higher taxes to
cover increased defense costs and who
vote the conscription of young Americans
for terms of obligated service which are
equaleC. in length among the NATO members only in Greece, Turkey, and Portugal-it makes us question policies that
require these sacrifices of our people
when others seem unwilling to make
equivalent sacrifices for themselves.
I reiterate, therefore, that while events
in Czechoslovakia may counsel a temporary wait-and-see with respect to the
present level of the American NATO contingent and dependents in Europe, these
events do not cancel the validity of the
concept of phased reductions. The fact
is that the invasion of Czechoslovakia
has not changed, in any way, two basic
elements in the proposal for such reductions which the Senate has had under
consideration for some time.
First. This Nation has budgetary and
balance-of-payments difficulties at a
time when the Western European nations are more able than ever before to
meet added costs of defense. Indeed, the
West Germans have a balance-of-payments surplus of several billion dollars a
year, a level so high that some West Germans describe it as "embarrassing."
Second. Our forces are in Europe for
the defense of the NATO countries
against the threat of military attack
from the East. Yet, despite Czechoslovakia, there is little indication that the
other NATO nations regard this threat
as drastic enough to stimulate any significant increase in financial and other
sacrifices for their own defense. Events
in Eastern Europe notwithstanding, if
the NATO countries are unwilling to
make the sacrifices and our present financial plight is prolonged, pressures for
a reduction of American forces in Europe
may be expected to resume promptlyand properly so.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I
congratulate the able majority leader,
and agree without reservation to his
statement this morning.
Recently a representative of the German Government called on us. The able
majority leader has expressed my sentiments so well I shall send a copy of his
address to that fine gentleman.
I hope our Stat.e Department realizes
that there is a large and growing feeling
in the Senate that concurs with these remarks just made; and hope also that
our allies in Europe realize the respect
we have and the American people have,
for this Member of this body who knows
so much about our foreign policy and
who has just returned from Europe.

As one who was in the executive branch
at the time of the creation of NATO
and the formation of SHAPE, I watch
with apprehension the lack of responsibility, apparently, of countries which
now have a crisis in their own backyards.
I hope they take to heart the wise observations of our majority leader this morning. This should be a joint defense in
Europe, and one set up on a realistic
basis; else it can only fail.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
wish to express my thanks to the senior
Senator from Missouri who has been a
leader in the fight, for more years than
I care to remember, in trying to bring
about a readjustment of policy vis-a-vis
our relations with our European allies.
The Senator has been an inspiration to
us all in this matter.
Mr. DODD. Mr. President, the distinguished majority leader is always wise
in his thoughts and I am always anxious
to hear what he has to say. I look forward to reading his speech in the RECORD.

COMMITTEE MEETING DURING
SENATE SESSION
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the Committee
on the Judiciary be authorized to meet
during the session of the Senate today.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.
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INCOME TAX REFORM ESSENTIAL
Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President,
we Americans bear an extremely heavy
income tax burden. our Internal Revenue laws are unfair. There must be income tax reform. Laws should be simplified, tax loopholes closed, and special
privileges to the ultrarich denied.
Last year, 37 Americans with incomes
of more than a half Inillion dollars paid
no income taxes whatever on their stupendous incomes. They owned many
Inillions of dollars worth of tax- free
bonds and took advantage of every tax
loophole available. In 1967 20 persons
whose incomes exceeded $1 million each
for that year paid no income taxes
whatever for the previous year, nor for
1967. These superrich taxpayers claim
charitable exemptions. Some create socalled charitable foundations. Unfortunately, we ordinary taxpayers must pay
more as these ultrarich do not pay their
fair share.
During recent years,
extremely
wealthy men and women purchase and
operate "Gettysburg farms" and then
claim tax losses from farlning. This can
be a device to cut down taxes on nonfarm income. Of course, the land values
of their farms increase tremendously
year after year, but our State and Federal Governments receive very little Increased taxes for that.
Middle-class wage earners and many
business and professional men bear the
burden of almost intolerable taxes while
those of great wealth buy tax-free bonds,
or large farms which are really showplaces in many instances, or take advantage of various available tax loopholes.
Another tax loophole is the 27%-percent depletion allowance for oil and gas
producing companies and the 23-percent
depletion allowance for some 41 other
minerals produced. The oil depletion allowance, in particular, has always appeared indefensible since the time in
1949 when I served on the Ways and
Means Committee. I have, since that period, consistently voted to reduce it or
abolish the allowance altogether. In
1967, five of the largest oil and gas producing corporations in the United States
with net profits approximating $6 billion paid only 9 percent in taxes to our
good Uncle Sam. This, due to the depletion allowance. This, at a time when individual Americans with modest earnings are shelling out at least one-fourth
of their incomes in taxes, or having
wages deducted to that extent.
Mr. President, it should be a most important duty of the 91st Congress convening next January to provide real and
needed tax reform.

ORDER FOR RECOGNITION OF
SENATOR DODD
Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that at the close of
the morning business and when the Senate takes up the pending business I be
recognized for such .t ime as may be
required.
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, reserving
the right to object, and I shall not object,
I wish to call the attention of the majority leader to this matter. We have before us a request for priority of recognition for as much time as the Senator
requires.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Does the Senator
from Connecticut ask to be recognized
in the morning hour?
Mr. JAVITS. After the morning hour.
The request blocks everybody from
speaking, and the Senator could take 3
days.
Mr. DODD. I shall not be that long.
Mr. JAVITS. Will the Senator put a
limit on the request?
Mr. DODD. I have no intention of preventing anyone from speaking.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the distinguished Senator from Connecticut [Mr.
DODD] be recognized immediately after
the conclusion of routine morning business and after the pending business is
laid before the Senate.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem- FORTAS-THORNBERRY AND THE
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
pore. Without objection, It is so ordered.
Mr. JAVITS. I have a 15-minute speech
Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, although
in connection with the Fortas nolnina- the Constitution provides that Supreme
tion. The Senator is acquainted with my Court Justices are to be appointed "with
problem. The Senator will accommodate the advice and consent of the Senate,"
me, will he not?
strangly enough, it seems to be the
Mr. DODD. I shall. My interest is in opinion of many that the "advice and
expediting the pending business. I did consent of the American Bar Associanot put a time limitation on my request tion"-not the Senate-is all that should
for the pw·pose of prolonging anything. be required.
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Apparently, we have arrived at a point upon to exercise a constitutional responwhere even some leaders of tile bar refuse sibility which affects the whole fabric of
to recognize the Senate constitutional American society for generations to
responsibility in the appointing process. come.
During the recent ABA convention in
What weight should be given to the
Philadelphia, Joseph A. Ball, president of recommendations of Mr. Jaworski? Acthe American College of Trial Lawyers, cording to the New York Times of August
was quoted as follows:
3, 1968, Mr. Jaworski is "a former attorLet's repudiate those lunatics (in the ney for President Johnson, who has been
Senate who questioned Justice Fortas) . . . associated with Mr. Johnson .for years."'
they are not fit to tie Justice Fortas' shoes. Could he reasonably have been expected
(Syracuse (N.Y.) Herald-American, August to report unfavorably on a Presidential
11,1968).
selection under such circumstances?
Why was the ABA committee given so
Over and over again, a refrain is heard
that the Senate should routinely con- little time in which to consider such imfirm the pending Supreme Court nomina- portant nominations? As I understand
tions because, after all, the ABA has de- it, the committee generally takes much
termined that the nominees are "quali- more time-often a week-to consider
nominations to lower court positions.
fied."
Of course, it is not the function of
In view of all this, I believe it is necessary and appropriate for the Senate to Congress to effect reforms in the procetake a close look at the role of the ABA dures of a private professional organizaand the procedures it has followed in tion. But the Senate should take note of
passing judgment on the pending such procedures as well as the fact that
nominations.
widespread misunderstanding seems to
Frankly, as one member of the ABA, have grown up concerning the role of
I was shocked to learn-and I believe the ABA in such matters.
many of my 133,000 fellow members will
In fairness, I should emphasize that
be shocked to learn-about the way ABA the ABA committee on the Federal juapproval came about in the case of diciary has acknowledged limitations on
the Fortas-Thornberry nominations.
its role. For example, letters from the
First. It should be understood, first of chairman of the committee, Albert E.
all, that these nominations have never Jenner, to Senator EASTLAND-see pages
been approved by the ABA membership 1, 69 of the hearings on nominations of
or by its governing body, the house of Fortas and Thornberry-transmitting
delegates. The only approval has come• the committee's recommendation with
from the ABA's Committee on the Fed- respect to Messrs. Fortas and Thorneral Judiciary.
berry contain this statement:
Second. Most of the members of the
Our responsibility is to express our opinion
12-man ABA Committee on the Federal 01f1Y on the question of professional qualifiJudiciary had no knowledge whatsoever cations which includes. of course, consideraof the Fortas-Thornberry nominations tion of age and health, and of such matters
until about 7 a.m. on the morning of as temperament, integrity, trial and other
education and demonstrated legal
June 26, the very day the President pub- experience,
abiUty. It is our practice to express no opinlicly announced his appointments.
ion at any time with regard to any other
Third. On that morning, the commit- consideration not related to such professional
tee "met"-if that is the proper term- qualifications which may properly be considby means of a telephone conference call ered by the appointing or confirming auwhich lasted the better part of 1 hour. thority.
During' this conference call the commitClearly, in its own letters, the ABA
tee members were informed of the Presi- committee recognizes that the confirmdent's intention, and they were advised ing authority-the Senate-may propof investigative reports on the nominees. erly take into account other consideraFourth. The investigation of Mr. tions not related to professional qualiThornberry was conducted by Leon fications.
Jaworski, of Houston, Tex., a close asUnder the circumstances, it is difficult
sociate for many years of President John- to understand why some ABA leaders
son. Mr. Jaworski, although not a mem- ciiticize the Senate when it sees fit to
ber of the committee, participated in exercise its constitutional respOnsibility
the conference call meeting.
by looking at matters outside the mere
Fifth. Since that time, Mr. Jaworski professional qualifications of a nominee.
has been quoted as saying he was asked
Of course, even in the limited area to
to investigate Judge Thornberry "be- which ABA approval is applicable, there
cause I knew him better than the others." is no obligation on the part of the SenSixth. Although it has been reported ate to substitute ABA judgment for its
that committee approval was unanimous own. Indeed, for the Senate to follow
I am advised that at least one membe1: such a course would be an abdication of
of the committee had no knowledge its constitutional responsibility.
whatsoever of the conference call and
And, of course, it is nonsensical to
took no part in any vote on the nominees.
In view of such circumstances, I won- suggest--as some have suggested-that
der what weight the members of the U.S. ABA approval of a nominee should someSenate are expected to assign to the oft- how preclude all further Senate inquiry,
cited approval by the American Bar As- even as to matters admittedly not covsociation of the Foiias-Thornberry ered by the ABA.
nominations.
' For example, in 1960 a suit was brought
After all, we are not picking an allTexas challenging the right of Mr. Johnson
America backfield or deciding whether in
to run for Vice President and Senator at the
Mickey Mantle should be on the all-star same time. Lawyers defending Mr. Johnson's
team. As U.S. Senators, we are called position included Jaworski and Fortas.
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In order to determine the weight to be
accorded the ABA approval in the Fortas-Thornberry case, the Senate should
know what matters were, in fact, considered by the ABA's committee during its
hour-long telephone meeting. Is a transcript of that discussion available to the
Senate? To what extent, if at all, did the
committee concern itself with Mr. Fortas' role as an advisor to the President
while sitting as a Justice of the Supreme
Court? Were the opinions of Judge
Thornberry, including the decision in
University Committee against Lester
Gunn, carefully reviewed by the committee during that hour?
As a member of the ABA, I have been
interested to find that a significant number of other members share my concern
about the inadequacy of present ABA
procedures-paliicularly in light of the
role in judicial selection claimed for the
ABA by some of its leaders.
During the course of this controversy,
some members have been surprised to
learn that the ABA does not pass on
whether a nominee is among the best
qualified for a judicial post, but merely
determines whether the nominee meets
a minimum standard of professional ·
qlilllification.
Some do not believe it is Iight for a
12-member committee to purpoii to
speak on such matters for the 133,000
members of the American Bar Association.
Dming the recent convention in Philadelphia, two resolutions calling for reforms in this area were submitted to the
ABA assembly. Although action has not
been taken, the mere introduction of
such resolutions was read by many as a
significant sign.
Fmihermore, I am aware that several
members of the ABA's Committee on the
Federal Judiciary were very much disturbed because they were expected on
the morning of June 26 to give such
hasty rubber-stamp approval to the
Fortas-Thornberry nominations. Because the time allowed for such consideration was so short and because the
political character of these and other
Supreme Court nominations has been so
apparent, I understand that members of
this ABA committee came close at Philadelphia to recommending that the ABA
abandon altogether its role with respect
to appointments to the Supreme Court.
Mr. President, while I am critical of
certain procedures which have been followed by one ABA committee in this particular situation, my remarks today
should not be interpreted as blanket
criticism of the ABA or of all its officers.
Indeed, I am proud of my membership
in this great association which has generally advanced the legitimate interests
of the legal profession in n:any commendable ways.
Neveiiheless, on this occasion, I am
convinced that there is need to reestablish and maintain a proper perspective
concerning the appropiiate roles of the
U.S. Senate and the ABA in the appointing process.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous COl'!.sent that an aiiicle from the New York
Times of August 3, 1968, an a1iicle from
the Los Angeles Times of August 3, 1968,

